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Abstract: In this paper I examine the impact of firms’ political connectedness on firm 
performance in private listed Chinese firms in the manufacturing sector, exploiting a policy 
shock, that is, the 4-trillion-yuan ($586-billion) economic stimulus plan in 2009 in response to 
the 2008 financial crisis. I use the difference-in-difference (DID) method to estimate the 
impact of political connectedness, comparing the change of firm performance in association 
with the stimulus between politically connected firms and non-connected ones. I find that 
political connectedness, particularly executives or directors being political delegates, enable 
firms to have better access to bank credit but have no direct impact on firm sales. Moreover, 
the two types of political connectedness, being political delegates or former officials, have 
different impact on firm profitability. 
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1 Introduction 
In a developing country with underdeveloped markets and market-supporting institutions, 
firms are found to have incentives to develop connections with governments (Jia, 2016; Li, 
Meng, & Zhang, 2006; Liu, Luo, & Xu, 2015) and thus political connectedness is particularly 
prevalent in developing countries (Faccio, 2006). To what extent and through which channels 
political connectedness affects firm performance attracts more and more attention among 
researchers recently in many fields. 
Many studies find that political connections have a positive effect on firm performance (Do,  
Lee, & Nguyen, 2015; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Feng, Johansson, & Zhang, 2014, 2015; 
Feng & Johansson, 2014; Fisman, 2001; Goldman et al., 2009; Haveman, Jia, Shi, & Wang, 
2016; Li et al., 2008; Liu, Uchida, & Gao, 2012; Su & Fung, 2013). The potential reasons are 
that politically connected firms enjoy benefits such as bank loans (Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 
2012; Charumilind, Kali, & Wiwattanakantang, 2006; Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008; 
Feng et al., 2015; Khwaja & Mian, 2005; Su & Fung, 2013; Xu, Xu, & Yuan, 2011; Yeh, Shu, 
& Chiu, 2013), favorable tax treatments (Adhikari et al., 2006; Claessens et al., 2008; Feng et 
al., 2015; Wu, Wu, Zhou, & Wu, 2012), easier access to state-controlled resources and lower 
risks of expropriation (Bunkanwanicha & Wiwattanakantang, 2009; Chen, Newman, Sun, & 
Wu, 2010; Cho & Joh, 2014; Cull & Xu, 2005; Faccio, Masulis, & Mcconnell, 2006; Feng et 
al., 2015; Li & Zhang, 2007; Li, Meng, Wang, and Zhou, 2008; Wu, Wu, & Rui, 2010, Yuan, 
2011), market power (Johnson & Mitton, 2003), and rent seeking (Feng et al., 2014; Guo, 
Jiang, Kim, & Xu, 2014).  
Besides the Besides those directly channels, there are also indirect channels through which 
political connectedness may have impacts on firm performance, for example, Xu, Yuan, Jiang, 
and Chan (2015) find that politically connected founders are more prone to appoint a second 
generation as a family firm executive or director, and second generation involvement 
improves firm performance with the curtailment of tunneling as an important channel of 
performance enhancement. 
Political connectedness is also found to have other impacts other than firm performance. Li, 
Song and Wu (2015) find a significant and positive relationship between political 
connectedness and the likelihood and extent of corporate philanthropy, and the effect is 
stronger in private firms in China. Ang and Jia (2014) find that politically connected firms are 
more prone to use courts over informal avenues of dispute resolution. 
Several studies find that political connections could be costly for firms and thus may have a 
negative impact on firm performance (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2007; 
Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2008; Faccio, et al., 2006), due to inefficient hiring (e.g. Bertrand 
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et al., 2007; Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Faccio, 2010; Saeed, Belghitar, & Clark, 2015; Wu, 
et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2012; Yuan, 2011), CEO incompetence and the insensitivity of CEO 
turnover to performance (Yuan, 2011), or inefficient investment (Liu et al., 2015; Saeed et al., 
2015). Though politically connected firms are more likely to get bank credit, they are also 
more likely to default (Khwaja & Mian, 2005), which may suggest their low efficiency in 
firm operation. 
Political connections may have other negative effects on firms. For example, politically 
connected firms are more likely to have poor quality of earnings report (Chaney, Faccio, & 
Parsley, 2011), tends to avoid potentially costly compliance measures by reporting fewer 
violations of safety compliance (Fisman & Wang; 2013), and are less likely to access 
international financing (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). 
In this paper I follow this strand of literature to study the net impact of political 
connectedness on Chinese firms’ performance, exploiting one recent policy shock in China. 
The subprime mortgage crisis originated from U.S. started to affect China’s economy in late 
2008. To cope with the economic difficulties caused by the crisis, China government 
launched the so-called “4-trillion-yuan ($586-billion) economic stimulus plan” in 2009 to 
stimulate the economy. The overall stimulus plan mainly included three interrelated 
components: an investment plan, an explosive increase of bank credit, and a series of 
industrial policies (Naughton, 2009; Fardoust, Lin, & Luo, 2012). Thus we may expect that 
politically connected firms benefit more than the non-connected ones from the stimulus 
program. Firstly, politically connected firms may get more support from government 
particularly during the crisis (Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006), for example, to get more 
government contracts (Cho & Joh, 2014). Secondly, politically connected firms are more 
likely to have access to bank credit. The stimulus plan thus provides us a good opportunity to 
examine whether politically connected firms can benefit more than those non-connected firms 
from the massive economic stimulus program. 
This study aims to test the impact of political connectedness exploiting the economic stimulus 
program. For this purpose, I restrict the study period near 2008-2009, covering the three years 
before the 2008 financial crisis, i.e. 2005-2007, and the three years following the 2009 4-
trillion-yuan stimulus program, i.e. 2010-2012, so that firms’ political connectedness are 
relatively stable. This sample of firms is those non-state-owned enterprises publically traded 
in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. There are two reasons why I choose the listed 
firms for the study. Firstly, In China, the listed firms are generally among the largest firms 
and are most important players in the economy, thus it is important to learn their behaviors. 
Secondly, much more abundant and reliable information is available on listed firms than on 
3 
non-listed firms. I further restrict the sample to private listed firms in the manufacturing 
industry to yield a more uniform sample. 
I use the difference-in-difference (DID) method, comparing the change of firm performance 
in association with the 4-trillion-yuan economic stimulus plan in 2008-2009 between 
politically connected firms and non-connected ones. Firm-level political connectedness is 
defined by executives and directors’ current political delegates status and past employment 
history in public sectors following Ang and Jia (2014). 
I find that the two types of political connectedness play different roles for firms. Executives 
or directors being delegates enables firm to have more access to loans, particularly short-term 
loans, but undermine firm’s profitability. However, executives or directors being former 
government officials have no significant impact on firm’s access to financing, but is 
positively correlated with firm profitability. Both types of connectedness have no contribution 
to firm’s sale, either domestically or internationally. This study may help reconcile the 
conflicts in previous studies regarding the impact of political connectedness on firm 
performance that some find positive impacts while others find negative impacts: different 
types of political connectedness may have different impacts on firm performance. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces data and research 
methodology. Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2 Data and Empirical Methodology 
Firms’ financial data are extracted directly from the China Security Market and Accounting 
Research (CSMAR) database, which covers all the listed firms in China stock market. 
Political connectedness is hand-collected from the resumes of each listed firm’s executives 
and directors (excluding independent directors), as many previous studies have done (e.g. 
Ang & Jia, 2014; Feng & Johansson, 2014; Feng et al., 2015; Haveman et al., 2016). 
A firm’s political connectedness is defined by two binary variables. The first is whether any 
executives or directors serves as a delegate of the People’s Congress (PC), the Congress of 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCCP), the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC) at the national and provincial levels. As a delegate of PC, CCCP, or 
CPPCC, an executive may enjoy a wide range of benefits such as social and political 
recognition, connections with important government bureaucrats, and policy influence (Li et 
al., 2006; Liu et al., 2015). The second is whether any executives or directors was a former 
government official at the division level (chu, a county head’s official rank) or above in the 
cadre hierarchy. This threshold level is commonly used in previous studies of defining firms’ 
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political connectedness since the division level or above is viewed as political elite and lower 
levels may not have enough political influence (e.g. Ang & Jia, 2014; Haveman et al., 2016). 
In the China context, senior managerial personnel of a firm being a political delegate or a 
former government official constitutes two main avenues by which firms directly connect to 
the government (Ang & Jia, 2014). The political connectedness captured in this paper is 
different from political connections gained without frequent interactions with government 
officials, such as Chinese Communist Party (CCP) membership (Li, Meng, & Zhou, 2008). It 
is also different from measures of indirect connections, such as whether one has friends 
working in the government (Tsai & Xu, 2014), whether one has relatives working in the 
government (Kung & Ma, 2016), or whether the firm are in the industry and the city a top 
political leader ever worked for and the leader was in power in the year (Qin, 2012).  
Figure 1 presents the share of firms in the manufacturing sector being politically connected in 
the period of 2005-2012. The shares of firms with executives or directors being delegates and 
former officials are slightly above 20% and 60% respectively. Moreover, the two indicators of 
political connectedness are quite stable in the study period, though there seems to exist a mild 
downward trend. 
Firm performance is measured by three sets of indicators. The first set is about firm financing, 
including debt ratio (total liabilities/total assets), short-term debt to asset ratio, and long-term 
debt to asset ratio. The second set is about sales, including logged total sales, logged domestic 
sales, and logged export. The third set is about profitability, including return on assets (ROA) 
and return on equity (ROE). The control variables include firm size measured by logged total 
assets, a dummy variable indicating a firm being listed in the main-board market (as opposed 
to the second-board market), and industry and year dummies to control for industry and year 
fixed effects. 
The empirical method is Difference in Difference (DID), which compares the change of firm 
performance in association with the 4-trillion-yuan ($586-billion) economic stimulus plan in 
2008-2009 between politically connected firms and non-connected ones, using the following 
equation: 
𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐶1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖 × 𝐶1𝑖𝑖+ + 𝛽4𝐶1𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖 × 𝐶2𝑖𝑖+ + 𝑋𝑖𝑖′ 𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖𝑖. 
𝑦𝑖𝑖 denotes a firm’s performance, measured by financing, sales, and profit indicators. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖 
indicates post-2008 financial crisis (and the massive economic stimulus) dummy, with the 
value equals to 1 if year is between 2010 and 2012, and 0 if year is between 2005 and 2007. 
Years 2008 and 2009 are excluded from the analysis, since in those two years the financial 
shock happened and the massive economic stimulus police was launched. 𝐶1𝑖𝑖  and 𝐶2𝑖𝑖 
represent a firm’s political connectedness, indicating any executives or directors being 
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delegates and former officials respectively. To capture the intensity of treatment, I calculate 
the numbers of years each firm has connections in the period 2005-2007 and 2010-2012 and 
use them as the values of connectedness in the pre-2008 and post-2008 period respectively. 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖 × 𝐶1𝑖𝑖  and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖 × 𝐶2𝑖𝑖  are the two interaction terms. 𝛽3  and 𝛽5  are thus the two 
parameters of interest, the treatment effects of political connectedness. 𝑋𝑖𝑖 is a vector of firm 
characteristics. 𝜀𝑖𝑖 is the error term. Standard errors are clustered by firm in the regressions. 
The final dataset contains 3,917 firm-year observations in the study period, 2005-2007 and 
2010-2012. The summary statistics of variables used in the empirical analysis are reported in 
Table 1. 
 
3 Empirical Results 
In this section I report the DID regression results for the three set of outcome variables in 
Tables 2-4 respectively. The regression structure is the same across the three tables. 
Table 2 presents the regression results for firms’ access to loans. Column 1 reports the results 
for debt ratio, i.e. total liabilities/total assets. The coefficient of the interaction between post-
2008 dummy and the delegates indicator is 0.020 and is statistically significant at 0.01 
significance level. It means that 1 standard deviation increase in the political connectedness 
measured by delegate’s status will increase the debt ratio by about 1.5 percentage point. 
However, the coefficient of the interaction between post-2008 dummy and former officials 
indicator is, small and insignificant at the conventional significance level, though the sign is 
the same as the delegates indicator.  
Next we check the impact of political connectedness on the two main components of total 
liabilities, i.e. current liabilities and long-term liabilities. Columns 2 and 3 report the 
regression results for short-term debt to assets ratio (current liabilities/total assets) and long-
term debt to assets ratio (long-term liabilities/total assets) respectively. It is interesting to see 
that the impact of political connectedness on financing is mainly on current liabilities, and 
only the delegates indicator is significant which is similar to column 1. This is different from 
what was found in Charumilind et al. (2006) that political connectedness enable firms to have 
more access to long-term bank credit in Thailand before the Asian crisis of 1997. 
In summary, political connectedness, particularly the delegates status does enable firm to 
have more access to short-term loans when there was a massive credit expansion in coping 
with the 2008 financial crisis.  
Table 3 presents the regression results for firms’ sales. Columns 1 to 3 show the results for 
logged total sales, logged domestic sales, and logged exports respectively. In all three 
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columns, the interaction terms between post-2008 dummy and political connectedness are not 
statistically significant. In other words, there is no evidence that political connectedness 
contribute to firm sales. 
Table 4 reports the regression results for two profit indicators, return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE) in columns 1 and 2 respectively. The coefficient of the interaction 
between post-2008 dummy and the delegates indicator is -0.009 in both columns 1 and 2, 
though the former one is statistically significant at 0.01 level, while the latter is only at 0.1 
level. It means that 1 standard deviation increase in the political connectedness measured by 
delegates status will decrease the profit by about 0.65 percentage point, either measured by 
ROA or ROE. This is economically meaningful impact since the average ROA and ROE in 
the sample is just 4.6 and 7.9 percentage point. This result is consistent with Liu et al. (2015) 
that political status may negatively affect firm performance since firms may make inefficient 
investment, particularly severe in private firms, to gain the political representatives status.  
In contrast to the delegates indicator, the coefficients of the interaction between post-2008 
dummy and the former officials indicator for ROA and ROE are both positive. The 
coefficients are 0.004 and 0.012 in columns 1 and 2 respectively, however it is not significant 
for ROA but significant for ROE at 0.05 significance level. Thus we have some evidence that 
former government officials can contribute to firm profitability. This might because hiring 
former government officials are much less costly than getting political delegates status, since 
there is no need to distort much firm investment or hiring decisions. 
 
4 Conclusions 
This paper studies the impact of firms’ political connectedness on firm performance in China, 
using the private listed firms in manufacturing sector during the period 2005-2012. Political 
connectedness of firms are measured by two indicators: the first one is whether any 
executives or directors serves as a delegate in the three main political congress, i.e. the 
People’s Congress (NPC), the Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCCP), the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) at the national and provincial 
levels; the second is whether any executives or directors ever worked for government at 
middle level or above. I find that both measures of political connectedness are quite stable in 
the study period, about 20% firms having executives or directors serving as delegates, and 60% 
of them have past working experience in government. 
To study the impact of political connectedness on firm performance, I exploit one quasi-
natural economic experiment, that is, the China government’s 4-trillion-yuan economic 
stimulus in 2009 in response of the 2008 financial crisis. To my best knowledge, this is the 
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first paper on political connectedness in China considering the massive economic stimulus 
plan as an external shock. 
The results show that the two types of political connectedness play different roles for firms. 
Executives or directors being delegates enables firm to have more access to loans, particularly 
short-term loans, but affect firm’s profitability negatively. However, executives or directors 
being former government officials have no significant impact on firm’s access to financing, 
but is positively correlated with firm profitability. Both types of connectedness have no 
contribution to firm’s sale, either domestically or internationally. The results may suggest that 
not all types of political connectedness are alike. The underlying mechanism needs more 
research in the future. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
variable N mean sd min max 
Debt ratio 3,730 0.385 0.213 0.007 0.996 
Short-term debt ratio 3,751 0.339 0.197 0.003 1.000 
Long-term debt ratio 3,865 0.039 0.073 0 0.792 
Total sales (unit: million Chinese yuan 
constant 2005 price) 
3,844 1452.746 3394.998 0 67139.172 
Domestic sales (unit: million Chinese yuan 
constant 2005 price) 
3,844 1217.495 2810.020 0 55864.066 
Export (unit: million Chinese yuan constant 
2005 price) 
3,844 235.251 1117.051 0 36352.188 
Total assets (unit: million Chinese yuan 
constant 2005 price) 
3,869 2002.916 3827.046 1.257 75525.445 
Return on assets (ROA) 3,853 0.046 0.099 -0.962 0.992 
Return on equity (ROE) 3,675 0.079 0.130 -0.945 0.931 
Post-2008 dummy 3,917 0.710 0.454 0 1 
Delegates 3,917 1.147 1.375 0 3 
Former officials 3,917 1.821 1.291 0 3 
Main board 3,917 0.480 0.500 0 1 
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Table 2: Political Connectedness and Debt Ratios 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post 2008 -0.110*** -0.120*** 0.005 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.005) 
Delegates -0.016** -0.017** -0.001 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) 
Post 2008* Delegates 0.020** 0.020** 0.001 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) 
Former officials 0.006 0.005 0.001 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) 
Post 2008*Former officials 0.003 0.002 -0.003 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.002) 
Logged assets 0.040*** 0.014* 0.021*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) 
Main board 0.167*** 0.142*** 0.025*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.004) 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.361 0.299 0.253 
Number of observations 3,730 3,751 3,865 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is debt ratio (total liabilities/total assets), 
short-term debt to assets ratio (current liabilities/total assets), and long-term debt to assets 
ratio (long-term liabilities/total assets) respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered by firm. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 3: Political Connectedness and Sales 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Post 2008 0.067 0.181* 0.395+ 
 (0.064) (0.080) (0.217) 
Delegates 0.033 0.037 -0.007 
(0.025) (0.029) (0.088) 
Post 2008* Delegates -0.000 0.034 -0.098 
(0.026) (0.030) (0.092) 
Former officials 0.006 0.052+ -0.087 
(0.024) (0.028) (0.084) 
Post 2008*Former officials 0.012 -0.037 0.026 
(0.023) (0.029) (0.085) 
Logged assets 1.108*** 1.063*** 0.944*** 
 (0.026) (0.028) (0.079) 
Main board -0.099* 0.055 -0.545** 
 (0.049) (0.055) (0.166) 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.771 0.695 0.285 
Number of observations 3842 3842 3842 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 to 3 is logged total sales, logged total domestic 
sales, and logged exports respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. + 
p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Table 4: Political Connectedness and Return Rate 
 (1) (2) 
Post 2008 0.021* 0.001 
 (0.009) (0.011) 
Delegates 0.008** 0.007 
(0.003) (0.005) 
Post 2008* Delegates -0.009** -0.009+ 
(0.003) (0.005) 
Former officials -0.007* -0.015** 
(0.003) (0.005) 
Post 2008*Former officials 0.004 0.012* 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Logged assets 0.016*** 0.028*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Main board -0.043*** -0.042*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) 
Year dummies Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y 
Adjusted R-squared 0.114 0.098 
Number of observations 3,852 3,675 
Number of firms 1,054 1,041 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is return on assets (ROA) and return on 
equity (ROE) respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by firm. + p<0.1, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Figure 1: Share of Firms with Political Connectedness 2005-2012 
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-An Empirical Study of Microprocessor, Mobile Cellular, and Genome Sequencing
Technologies-
Working
Paper 12-05 Man Cho Contagious Real Estate Cycles: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Implications
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– Evidence from Municipalities/Regencies in Indonesia –
Working
Paper 12-07 Younguck KANG
Civil Petitions and Appeals in Korea
: Investigating Rhetoric and Institutional settings
Working
Paper 12-08
Yu Sang Chang
Jinsoo Lee
Alternative Projection of the World Energy Consumption
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Working
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Sunme Lee
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Investigating Korean Bureaucracy through PIAAC
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An Empirical Analysis on the Geography of Korea’s High-Tech Jobs and Start-Ups
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